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Abstract
This paper proposes an anatomy of the phenomena of life and of correlate qualitative modes of empirical research, theory,
and professional practice concerned with health and well-being. I explicate the qualitative dynamic operative at every level
of order, from the biological realm of cells and organisms, through distinctively human lifeworld experiences and practices,
to communities of organisms in ecosystems and bio-cultural regions. This paper clarifies the unity of the dimensions of life
and aligns these with demonstrated and emerging contributions of hermeneutical phenomenology and current complexity 
autopoietic theory (including disciplinary and professional interpretations of empirical findings). The intent is begin to
delineate a common framework upon which we could build*facilitating better understanding of the distinctive
contributions of each specialization as well as the integration of diverse qualitative approaches with each other (and with
quantitative complements).
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Though phenomenology and empirical science are
in a period of rich exchange, there are unnecessarily
missed opportunities to deepen our understanding
of qualitative approaches and to enact more robust
research and praxis concerning health and well-
being. This essay will contribute to overcoming the
fracture of specializations and avoidable misunder-
standings by making explicit the unity that runs
through the ‘‘arc of life’’ and by showing how
phenomenology and complexity theory are comple-
mentary in the way they operate across the entire
range of integrated phenomena (Varela & Bouegie,
1992). These congruent interpretations robustly
describe the critical qualitative dimensions of the
anatomy of life and how to better approach well-
being through research and diagnostic, therapeutic,
and preventive practices. By elaborating the frame-
work I intend to demonstrate the possibilities for
further specialized yet integrated work by readers of
this journal.
Part I: The human lifeworld and modes of
interpretation
Methods
Iemployahermeneuticmethodtointegratethemajor
contributions made by phenomenology and the
empirical sciences broadly identifiable as complexity
theory, showing how their qualitatively oriented
approaches are complementary and together consti-
tute a continuum. Specifically, I explicate interpreta-
tions of (a) the structures of bio-cultural phenomena
and the constitution of concepts such as ‘‘organism,’’
‘‘person,’’ ‘‘health,’’ ‘‘disease,’’ ‘‘well-being,’’ and
‘‘environment’’ and (b) self-organizing space time
patterns of organism environment relationships
within which our human mode of embodiment
emerges. I do this for phenomenology (Husserl,
1989; Heidegger, 1995), philosophical anthropology
(Goldstein, 2000; Uexku ¨ll, 1926), and philosophy of
medicine (Engelhardt, 2006; Zaner, 2004). I analyze
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dynamics and open, non-linear processes (Prigogine,
1980), autopoietic systems (Maturana & Varela,
1998), developmental systems theory (DST)
(Oyama, 2000), dialectical biology (Lewontin &
Levins, 2007), and neurophenomenology enaction
(Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).
We can better appreciate the contributions made
by both qualitative and quantitative research, and
theory insofar as we develop a unified understanding
of what might be called the ‘‘arc of life’’*that ranges
from the energy flows of physical chemical processes
to cells, organs, whole organisms in Umwelts, other-
than-human and human communities, ecosystems,
and bio-cultural regions*and the place of persons
within it. The figure of the ‘‘arc of life’’ delineates a
framework for understanding these self-organizing,
open, far-from-equilibrium phenomena and thus a
non-arbitrary opening for further interpretation of
empirical investigations and new (re)interpretations
of previous findings (Juarrero, 2002). This anatomy
provides a more adequate basis than hitherto for
decision-making and pragmatic action in regard to
critical issues: Is health to be considered in terms of
each individual, or each species, or each ecological
network? What actions would be adequate in regard
to animal, human, and ecosystem well-being?
Accordingly, this essay moves hermeneutically,
beginning with the human because it is the directly
given phenomenal realm and then recovering the
contexts upon which it depends and the conditions
within which it thrives. I present something of a
phenomenology of human life at the beginning and
then continue to unpack its multiple horizons so that
we can appreciate simultaneously the emergence of
distinctive levels of life’s ordering processes, the
operative hierarchical governance and principles of
intelligibility, and the complex factors bearing on
health and well-being. Figure 1 depicts the basic
anatomy of the dimensions of life.
Specific lifeworlds, especially the distinctively human
mode of embodiment and existence
Alongthecontinuousarcoflife,whereflowsofenergy
and ordering processes operate uninterruptedly from
the molecular to planetary, it is useful to think of
multiple domains, one running from the molecular
level to organisms, another from organisms to
communities of organisms and ecosystems, including
their co-constituted macro-environments. A third
dimension is found in the distinctive lifeworlds of
given organisms (Merleau-Ponty, 2003; Uexku ¨ll,
1926) that occur at mid-level where we recognize
coherent patterns of placement and life activity that
qualitatively differ from one kind of being to another
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963; Varela et al., 1991).
Macro/Cosmic                     
     Atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere  
        biosphere 
        Ecosystems of communities 
         Communities in bio-cultural environments 
         Organisms   distinctive lifeworlds           
                          including humans  
         Membranes/cells                  
         Bio-chemical/molecular (genetic)  
    physical–chemical 
Micro/Sub-atomic
Of course, issues of health and well-being are not
limited to humans: other-than-human organisms and
ecosystems have their own parameters in regard to
these values and humans can attain well-being only
in relation to the micro-organisms and macro-
environments that provide the parameters of our
lifeworlds*to which we will return in Part II. But,
given the value historically placed on persons,
it is appropriate to begin with human health
and well-being (Thomasma, Weisstub, & Herve ´,
2001) using non-arbitrary categories and a set of
hierarchical‘‘levelsoforderofprocesses’’oremergent
phases.
Distinctively human lifeworld:
(d) Political ethical community life.
(c) Unique individuality of each person.
(b) Intentional movement and action.
(a) Human sub-personal physiological neurological
 psychological life.
Human sub-personal physiological neurological 
psychological life
Our sub-personal functions have many commonal-
ities with other organisms, yet also distinctive
patterns, capacities, and limitations correlate with
our particular mode of being embodied in the world.
Here naturalized phenomenology has made
empirical and theoretical advances in exploring
cognition, perception, emotion, and the nervous
and immune systems in a way that substantially
challenges the dominant sciences*continuing the
trajectory of the phenomenology of Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty and the pioneering work of
philosophical anthropology (Goldstein, 2000;
Straus, 1963), which began a tradition of caring
practices still influential in nursing, social work,
clinical psychology, psychiatry, and treatment of
traumatized and brain-damaged patients.
This sphere usually goes unnoticed as we unself-
consciously participate in our lifeworld. We only
attend to it when a ‘‘breakdown’’ occurs during
Robert Mugerauer
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is implicitly held in the key word: disease. Dis-
continuity in the ordinary flow of our well-being (as
distinct from a surprising injury) is marked by a
feeling, literally, of disease, in which there occurs
‘‘a disorganization of a patient’s whole world’’
(Pellegrino, 1979, p. 64).
The sub-personal world is emergent, constituted
as our internal autopoietic organization maintains its
own endogenous activity and as we interact with the
environment through complex and delicate patterns
of sensorimotor activity. Since our human possibi-
lities emerge from our mode of situated, embodied
consciousness our particular kind of placement is
     Macro/Cosmic
            World
  Biosphere:   
  Atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere   
Bio-cultural-regions 
Ecosystems of communities
Communities (of populations 
of organisms)
Umwelt/lifeworlds
Human                   }  Including   with built environments
lifeworld:                }  humans    
        3. Political–ethical life                                      }         
2. Unique individuality of each person,                }     
1. Specifically human mode of embodiment            }
     (b) Intentional movement and action `           }
     (a) Sub-personal physiological–                           }     
                neurological–psychological             }     
Organisms
Organs—immune, nervous, and
endocrine systems 
Tissues 
Sheets  
Cells   
Membranes   
Bio-chemical/ 
molecular (genetic)   
Micro/Sub-atomic 
Physical–chemical
Figure 1. Arc of life: anatomy of life and environmental interpretation.
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as directional beings, with a strong vertical and
horizontal orientation, with an upright posture,
binocular vision, and distinctive hands that grasp
and turn things (Maturana & Varela, 1998; Straus
1963), our health and well-being are intimately
bound up with our lived body ‘‘as a centered unity,’’
such that a major symptom of illness is feeling
‘‘disoriented’’ (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1988).
Much therapeutic action depends on identifying
and treating the bio-chemical and physiological
systems at play in our sensorimotor, perceptual,
and cognitive lives where sub-personal well-func-
tioning and social conditions interact (Aho & Aho,
2008). Sub-personal phenomena such as breathing,
temperature-regulation, saccadic eye movements as
we scan our environment, and feelings are illumi-
nated by phenomenologically oriented research on
embodied cognition (Thompson, 2007). For
example, the immune system is paradigmatic for
other sub-personal phenomena since it plays a
critical role in our ability to ‘‘ensure homeostasis of
our internal molecular environment, a coherence of
all organic systems,’’ and also involves fundamental
conceptions of health and ‘‘self,’’ relationships
among parts and wholes, and organism environ-
ment interactions (Coutinho & Kazatchkine, 1994,
p. 5). The traditional clonal selection theory (CST)
now is challenged by the autonomous network
theory (ANT) developed by neuro-phenomenology
(Varela & Coutinho, 1991) which contends ‘‘that
immune disorders are a form of the failure of
homeostasis’’ (Coutinho & Kazatchkine, 1994).
Though new therapies are not fully developed,
treatments being explored seek ways for the whole
immune system, integrated into a network with the
nervous and endocrine systems, to autopoietically
maintain its own organization and endogenous
activity despite perturbances (Tauber, 1994, pp.
173 174).
Intentional movement and action
Normally we measure our health and well-being
directly in terms of intentional action: our capacities
to move ourselves or alter our world with a measure
of control. The ability to oppose gravity by ‘‘getting
up’’ every day, by ourselves, provides each of us a
measure of our health and well-being throughout the
course of our lives as we choose how to comport
ourselves (Straus, 1969, pp. 34 42). It is not
surprising that the focus of most research and
clinical practices has been on self-regulation, rang-
ing from bio-chemical cures and therapies for
ulcers, broken bones, emotional distress, and other
incapacitating conditions (Kahneman, Diener, &
Schwarz, 1999). Again, the normal state of sponta-
neous engagement with projects in the world pro-
vides
the baseline from which Gadamer (1996, pp. 43,
112 115) can define health in terms of ‘‘the general
equilibrium of the life in which [we are normally]
active and able to be’’ ourselves, ‘‘involved in the
world and being together with one’s fellow human
beings, in active and rewarding engagement in one’s
everyday tasks.’’
Becauseoftheextenttowhichourlivesareamatter
of self-aware, deliberate attempts to accomplish what
weprojectasgoals(Gallagher&Zahavi,2008)thereis
increasing (re)appreciation of the fundamental role
played by practical knowledge. ‘‘Absorbed skillful’’
activity is developed into masterful performance as
theresultoflearningacquiredthroughexperienceand
reflective practice (Flyvjberg, 2001)*a crucial
point in political decision-making and the caring
professions (Benner, Tanner, & Chelsa, 1996). In
turn, our practices enact communal beliefs and
values. The core reason for this essay’s topic and this
journal derives from the fact that we qualitatively
respond to issues of health and well-being because of
our understanding of humans as unique persons and
because we do care for each other.
The unique individuality of each person
The emergence of humans as individually unique,
though culturally and historically variable, is one of
the most powerful drivers in the westernized world.
How we act in regard to human health and well-
being is linked with the way the individuality of each
person is (or is not) recognized when disease is
perceived as an interruption of identity*‘‘I just
don’t feel like myself, doctor’’ (Caplan, Engelhardt,
& McCartney, 1981, p. 505). Congruently, many
argue that the accomplishments of the last 40 years
in turning attention to the patient as person need
to be affirmed, even expanded, in the face of
post-humanist movements (Benner et al., 1996;
Thomasma et al., 2001).
In the broader scientific-cultural context, focus on
the person resists reductivisms at both micro- and
macro-scales. The current ‘‘gene-centric’’ emphasis
on the molecular atomizes the body, replacing it with
infomatic-codes (Lewontin, 1991); at the opposite
extreme, individuals (and societies of individuals)
are statistically dissolved into populations (a point of
contention between public health and primary care
approaches). Unavoidably, these alternative scienti-
fic views carry ethical implications as to who*or
Robert Mugerauer
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when pursuing health and well-being.
Recent research is congruent with the traditional
medicalcharge:relievingthesufferingofthepatientat
hand; even a goal of restoring or maintaining a
patient’snormalconditionreferstotheirparticularity,
not to a general category. Canguilhem (2008, p. 132)
questions the usual definition of ‘‘the pathological,’’
arguingthatrigorouslyspeaking,‘‘‘pathological’isthe
vital contrary of ‘healthy’ and not the logical contrary
of ‘normal’ // [for example] as we move ‘‘across the
many intermediaries from morphological anomaly to
functional disease’’:
We cannot determine the normal by simple
reference to a statistical mean but only by compar-
ing the individual to itself, either in identical
successive situations or in varied situations.
// A norm // must help us understand concrete
individual cases // [where an alteration in] the total
comportment of an organism // does not appear to
be a disease until the moment when the being’s
existence, hitherto in equilibrium with its milieu,
becomes dangerously troubled. (Goldstein, 2000,
pp. 128 129, 131)
One of the major ways to articulate and comprehend
the individuality of a person is through medical
narratives (Kleinman, 1988; Zaner, 2004). This
is especially important insofar as the success of
scientific knowledge and rationalized technology
‘‘actually increases the qualitative’’ distance from
‘‘the correct decisions of the moment’’ (Gadamer,
1996, p. 21; Mol, 2008). In order to
help a patient grapple with the loss of health and
find meaning in illness and dying // along with
their growing scientific expertise, doctors, [nurses,
and social workers] need the expertise to listen to
their patients, to understand as best they can the
ordeals of illness. (Charon, 2006, p. 3)
Further, recognizing that discernments and diag-
noses of health and illness are made within historical
communities (Caplan et al., 1991) raises the question
of differences and similarities across cultures, a
project requiring sophisticated cross-cultural anthro-
pological and historical studies (such as Bergdolt,
2008; Engelhardt, 2006; Tao Lai Po-wah, 2006).
Political and ethical life
In terms of the stable organization and changing
structural characteristics of autopoietic systems,
humans emerge as self-conscious and enactively
bring forth a world through structural couplings
that are always already social linguistic. Within the
complex systems of coupling and feedback that
constitute the unity of each particular human
society differences in historical, biological, and
cultural perceptions and valuations underlie differ-
ences in the ways we care for or exploit environ-
ments and each other (Maturana & Varela, 1998,
p. 232). The variety of viable human lifeworlds is
not accidentally related to our flexibility and
resilience since the possibilities generated by our
symbolic transformations eventually play out as the
openness critical for our well-being (Heidegger,
1995; Plessner, 1980).
Especially in humans, health is precisely a certain
latitude, a certain play in the norms of life and
behavior. What characterizes health is a capacity
to tolerate variations in norms on which only the
stability of situations and milieus // confers a
deceptive value of definite normalcy. Humans are
truly healthy only when capable of several norms,
when they are more than normal. The measure of
health is a certain capacity to overcome organic
crises and to establish a new physiological order,
different from the old. (Canguilhem, 2008, p. 132)
In terms of health and well-being, differences in
access to resources also appear, so that conflicts and
practices of ‘‘unequal’’ allocation are matters of
justice. Granting the fundamental importance of the
biological base of health and well-being, many con-
tend that the greatest problems concerning quality of
health actually are social: the reason why so many
people remain subject to disease, suffering, and early
death when we have the knowledge and technical
means to intervene finally would lie in our economic
and political structures (Lewontin, 1991, pp. 44 45).
Nor would environmental well-being*ecological
sustainability*occur unlesswe dealwith the role that
poverty plays (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,
2003).
What would provide a morally and politically
adequate basis for decisions and actions? Just as the
universalizing abstractions of quantitative science, in
principle and fact, falter before the uniqueness of
persons in regard to particular historical lifeworlds
a contextual epistemology is both theoretically
superior and operationalizable. This is especially
true for the healing professions, law, and the
ethical political realms because of the understanding
that is gained through practice, clients’ biographies,
and the diversity of valid local knowledge
Anatomy of life and well-being
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(Flyvjberg, 2001; Longino, 1990, p. 195).
Where well-being is understood as a matter of the
individual person within communally enacted bio-
cultural realms the idea of health as the capacity to
engage uninterruptedly in one’s lifeworld connects
to the hitherto mainly ecological concept of resi-
lience (Mugerauer, 2010a). Thus, issues of human
health and well-being open to questions concerning
the relation of human lifeworlds and those of other
organisms.
PART II: The arc of life as the horizon of health
and well-being
Since the specifically human takes place within and
as unseparated from the comprehensive arc of life
the next step is to consider the horizons within which
human communities emerged and are maintained:
physico-chemical and then biological bases on the
one side, and ecosystems and a supporting biosphere
on the other side*keeping in mind that there are
Umwelts for millions of other organisms, all of which
also are within these physical systems and webs of
ecosystems.
Bio-chemical (molecular) to organisms
Membrane and cell. The emergence of the cell*the
fundamental unit of life*from the physical chemi-
cal opens the question of health and well-being for
the first time because with the cell we have the
phenomena of an entity that lives and dies, as
distinct from what merely endures or disappears.
Though the part is only intelligible within the whole
web of life and the biosphere, it is not surprising that
disagreements about what life is and what the focus
of our research and therapies should be center on
questions concerning the character of the micro-
molecular level and its relation to the living beings of
which the micro is ‘‘a part.’’ This is especially the
case since the dominant view of science (as well as its
funding, research projects, and therapeutic or com-
mercial applications) has shifted from biology and
zoology to micro-studies as a result of the break-
throughs in operationalizing models of molecular
combination in DNA and RNA. That a cell (or
multi-celled being) depends on continuation of its
physio-chemical processes is not in question. Rather,
the issue is whether or not health and well-being
primarily and finally are a matter of the continuation
of the molecular processes alone or of the cellular
(multi-cellular organism) as a whole. For example,
the ideas of the selfish gene and the organism as the
mere vehicle for molecular continuity provide a
radically different measure than does the organism
itself.
Macro/Cosmic                  
     Atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere  
        biosphere 
         Ecosystems of communities 
         Communities in bio-cultural environments 
         Organisms    distinctive lifeworlds          
     Organs—immune, nervous, and endocrine a
                                            systems 
         Tissues 
         Sheets 
         Cells 
            Membranes                  
         Bio-chemical/molecular (genetic)  
    physical–chemical 
Micro/Sub-atomic 
Molecules and membranes together operate at the
beginning of life: molecules combine and are ‘‘held’’
together inside a membrane, even as some are
transported across it, to form cells. The emergence
of the cell as the primal life-form depends upon
the membrane, which allows for the emergence of
something with identity, i.e., both distinguished
from the flux and participating in processes of
exchange with the external elements that are vital
to life (Yeagle, 1992). Here, for the first time, an
individual life occurs, persisting for a while to the
extent that it thrives or fails (Morowitz, 1992).
Though membranes are substantial enough to
delimit an inside from an outside they do not seal
the cell off from its surroundings (Fleischaker,
Colonna, & Luisi, 1994). On the contrary, the
membranes are porous, allowing the transactions
across the membrane to and from its environment
thatarecriticaltoitsremainingalive(Cavalier-Smith,
2004). They also are plastic: physically flexible and
changeable in form during their own development
and allowing for multiplication or reproduction.
These features of the structure of the cellular mem-
brane and thus of the cell*porous boundaries and a
plasticity that delineate identity while, respectively,
enabling coupling, and transformations*characterize
all life and set measures for well-being.
While the formation of (cellular) membranes is
intelligible in terms of the processes of lipids and
hydrophilic/hydrophobic molecules, mystery still
surrounds the transformation to the living cell
(Yeagle, 1992). If we do not pause at this enigma,
beyond the relation of a given cell to its physico-
chemical basis and environment it interrelates with
surrounding populations of other similar or different
Robert Mugerauer
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(Cavalier-Smith, 2004). Here the health and well-
being of many life-forms are entangled with each
other, so that understanding and action require
qualitative discernments of identity, difference,
and relation. The story of the development from
unicellular to multicellular organisms, while still
speculative, nonetheless can be puzzled out: the
increasingly accepted account holds that eukaryotes
emerged by way of symbiosis and symbiogenesis of
prokaryotes (Hirt & Horner, 2004, pp. 2 4), where
some were only partially ingested by those feeding
on them, resulting in a fusion of one within the
other, such that the hybrid became eukaryotic*a
completely unpredictable branching off that led to
fungi, animals, plants (Margulis & Sagan, 1995).
Since composite life-forms already emerge at the
basic cellular level clearly the well-being of a given
‘‘living thing’’ depends on the thriving of interactive
‘‘components,’’ some of which are permanently
fused while others remain distinct.
Organisms and surroundings (Umwelt). As life unfolds
from singular cells to sheets of cells to tissues,
as organs and complex immune and nervous systems
evolve, organisms emerge. The intricacy of each
‘‘element,’’ of relations among elements internal to
the organism, and of the connections of these with
the environment constitute the bulk of life science
research and medical practices, and generate one of
our most troubled questions: What are the most
revealing definitions and the most illuminating ways
to understand ‘‘organisms’’? There is an ambiguity
in the term ‘‘organism’’ because its meaning*‘‘a
unified, autopoietic form of life’’*denotes both the
cell and the complex of cells we recognize as a plant
or animal. Maturana and Varela distinguish the
two modes as first- and second-order autopoietic
structures (I use ‘‘cell’’ to refer to first-order
structures and ‘‘whole organism or just ‘‘organism’’
to refer to the second-order). The argument is that
a shift occurs with the emergence of ‘‘the total
organism as a mobile unit in space,’’ for ‘‘the passage
to cognition occurs at the level of a behavioral entity,
and not, as in the basic cellular self, as a spatially
bounded entity,’’ where the organism ‘‘by the very
same process of constituting itself, configures an
external world of perception and action’’ (Varela &
Bouegie, 1992, p. xiii).
It is precisely with the phenomena of the organism
that we can fully appreciate the inadequacy of the
gene-centric view in debating whether the organism
should continue to be set aside in favor of the
molecular*i.e., as we pose the critical question
‘‘the health of what?’’ (Harold, 2001). The usual
reductive view of genes as the basic and only
‘‘atoms’’ of life, which replicate themselves and build
up into organisms fails: ‘‘Between the information
coded into genes and the adaptive traits of a plant or
animal (i.e., between genotype and phenotype),
there are several layers of self-organizing processes,
each sustained by endogenously generated stable
states, themselves a matter-energy flow’’ (DeLanda,
1997, p. 112; Kauffman, 1993, p. 525). Genes do
not reproduce themselves; DNA does not self-
replicate, much less determine the final outcome
we call a living being since ‘‘genomes are entire
genetic systems, active only when they reside inside
cells’’: ‘‘membranes and cell skeletons interact
with each other and with genes, catalysts, small
molecules, ions, and water to make cells that can
grow and divide; // genes do not make organisms’’
(Cavalier-Smith, 2004, p. 336; Margulis & Sagan,
2002, p. 37). Indeed the ‘‘turning off and on of the
production of the body’s constituents (such as
proteins) is itself sensitive to external conditions’’
and ‘‘organisms actually change the basic physical
nature of signals that come to them from the external
world,’’ for example, as changes in temperature are
converted within the body to changes in the con-
centration of blood sugar and of some hormones
that are detectable by the liver (Lewontin, 1991,
pp. 47 48, 116).
Insofar as zoology and biology yield to the
molecular and genetic by assuming that there is
nothing important beyond the molecular materials
and processes we abandon the cell and organism.
But 90 years ago, Uexku ¨ll already pointed out that
given the character of the nervous system the various
stimuli causing excitement could not be qualitatively
differentiated by the nervous system itself because
within the system all such differences are removed.
Rather a more complex integration of information
and context needs to be provided*carried out*by
the organism which is able to qualitatively differ-
entiate and respond to what is in its surroundings
(Uexku ¨ll, 1926, p. 147). ‘‘If anything in the world
can be said to be self-replicating, it is not the gene,
but the entire organism as a complex system’’; the
brain does not perceive, the animal does (Lewontin,
1991, p. 48).
Complexorganisms,justasindividualcells,display
a plasticity that allows processes generating sub-
stantialpolymorphism,theveryflexibilityofelements
that opens the possibility of reproduction, develop-
ment, and evolution. Individual elements are so
plastic that from them alone one can neither predict
what they will become, nor where: a given set of
genetic materials may develop variously into eyes or
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nervous, and immune systems. Pragmatically, under-
standing this range of flexibility and stability manifest
in changes that happen during individual lifetimes or
throughevolutionrequiresthatweconsider thewhole
organism in its environmental context.
Growth and developmental studies have assumed
increased importance in accounting for how an
organism ‘‘maintains a unity*at all times a unity of
fullness, not from incomplete to complete’’*while
undergoing dynamic, discontinuous change (Varela,
1979, p. 67). Current research and reassessments in
DST, constructivist interactionism, emergence, and
co-evolution are elaborating an epigenetic position
(in contest with the performatist view wherein
development is understood to ‘‘be performed by
genes’’) that clarifies the interactive dynamic among
organisms and their environments (Oyama, Griffiths,
& Gray, 2001, p. 4). Not only humans, but organisms
at all scales modify and are modified by their
environments in ways that are far more complex
than are accounted for in dominant neo-Darwinian
genetic-environment modeling (Mugerauer, 2010b).
Environment influences growth and development. Forall
the importance of genetics, environmental factors
canradicallymodifyorganisms‘‘inprocess’’asitwere
(whichmeansthatorganicformsareneitherinherent-
fixed nor biologically generated-determined). ‘‘In
general, the morphology, physiology, metabolism,
and behavior, i.e., the phenotype of an organism at
any moment in its life is a product of both the genes
transmitted from the parents and the environment
in which development has occurred up until that
moment’’ as is well documented by studies showing
how environmental factors such as light, diet,
temperature, humidity, and local chemicals can
significantly modulate the character and possible
activityofmanyorganisms.Yet,naturalenvironments
arenotgivenasfixedcontextswithinwhichorganisms
must reactively adapt to survive in a inexorably
deterministic, competitive process, as is seen in the
way organisms actively participate in and modify
events by means of both niche selection and
construction (Lewontin, 1991, p. 117).
In the first place, organisms select what counts as
or amounts to a niche for that organism as was
famously presented by Uexku ¨ll (1926, p. 126) with
his conception of Umwelt (perhaps best translated as
‘‘surround world’’ or ‘‘effective surroundings,’’) and
argued by Merleau-Ponty (1963, p. 13):
It is the organism itself*according to the proper
nature of its receptors, the thresholds of its nerve
centers and the movements of its organs*which
chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which
it will be sensitive. ‘‘The environment (Umwelt)
emerges from the world through the actualization
or the being of the organism*[granted that] an
organism can exist only if it succeeds in finding in
the world an adequate environment.’’
Secondly, creatures ranging from flies and spiders
to fish, birds, and mammals actively shape their
environments, changing them in what is nothing less
than niche construction (Turner, 2000; Von Frisch,
1974). Empirical and theoretical analyses of
organism-engineered environments explicates a
third point: a higher-order self-organizing system
(beyond autopoietic cells and individual organisms)
unfolds when the environments selected as relevant,
produced, or modified influence the development of
offspring, for example in the cases of oviparous
insects or with the nurturing that occurs in nests and
dens. Thus, niche construction provides ‘‘a bonafide
inheritance system’’ that shapes future populations
(Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2001, pp.
118 120; Sterelny, 2001, p. 336).
Fourthly, organism-generated changes unavoid-
ably impact other forms of life, as is the case with
beavers’ modifications of the structure and dynamics
of riparian zones that can persist for centuries,
influencing the composition and diversity of both
plant and animal communities living within that
world (Jones, Lawton, & Shachak, 1997; Laland
et al., 2001, p. 119). A fifth dimension appears
through the long-term changes occurring in future
generations of all the affected organisms. To continue
our example, the beavers’ constructed dam and
lodge, and the altered rivers that are the heritage of
future generations of all organisms in the local
environment creates a ‘‘cascade effect’’ setting ‘‘up
a host of selection pressures that feed back to act on //
genes that may influence // many other aspects of
their phenotypes’’ (Laland et al., 2001, p. 119). Such
behaviors finally influence the evolution of their own
and other species. That is, empirical evidence and
new interpretations of how populations and their
environments are co-constructed and co-evolve move
us toward an interactionist model of organisms 10
environment (Mugerauer, 2010b).
Organisms to bio-cultural regions
Beyond the organism there still remain the larger
domains of entire ecosystems, bio-cultural regions,
and the biosphere. Whether, or to what extent,
the status of individuality applies to other than
recognizably whole organisms (in and as commu-
nities) is a matter of considerable debate because it is
crucial for decisions concerning well-being where
Robert Mugerauer
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most of what we consider ethical political rights
and duties. The question of individuality in regard
to ‘‘community,’’ in its variations of aggregates,
assemblages, composites, collectives, colonies, and
confederacies is complicated, due in part to the
phenomena themselves, in part to our (contested)
conceptual categories and vocabulary.
Macro/Cosmic                  
     Atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere  
        biosphere 
         Bio-cultural regions 
         Ecosystems of communities 
        Communities of populations of organisms 
         Organisms    distinctive lifeworlds          
         Membranes and cells                  
         Bio-chemical/molecular (genetic)  
    physical–chemical 
 Micro/Sub-atomic 
What is it for which we would be responsible
(Thomasma et al., 2001)? Given the primary point
that the unity of biological diversity is blurred as
each organism associates with others across dynamic
boundaries, should we not operate from the new
assumption that to understand the character of the
living, the key is to ‘‘ask not what an individual is,
but ‘how’ it is in relation to its connectedness’’
(Margulis & Sagan, 1995, p. 5)? Should we not act
on the correlate new implication for health: if we are
walking assemblages of cells, we imagine pathogen
microbes attacking us; but if they are part of the
collectives that form us ‘‘isn’t health less a question
of resistance to invasion from the outside and much
more an issue of ecological relationships among
committee members’’ (Magulis & Sagan, 2002,
p. 19)? According to the unified systems approach
‘‘health and disease, rather than representing dis-
crete ‘states’ or conditions as in traditional views,
need to be seen as phases of the continuously
changing multilevel set of processes (e.g., cellular,
chemical, physiological, behavioral) that at any one
moment constitute’’ an organism’s life (Fabrega,
1981, p. 513).
As we have seen, combining the quantitative and
qualitative by thinking in terms of self-organizing
non-linear, dynamic, complex systems helps us to
understand emergent phenomena often displaying
both unexpected and not easily discernable patterns.
In the biological sphere, such pattern formation
appears in unicellular organisms, in multi-cellular
aggregates, in physiology with its homeostasis
(glucose concentrations, the human menstrual
cycle), in ‘‘dynamical diseases (ovulatory disorders,
sudden cardiac arrest)*where recognition of the
dynamic character has changed the courses of
treatment’’ (Camazine, Thies, Ristine, & Didion,
2001, pp. 95, 100 103; Sole ´ & Goodwin, 2000,
pp. 91 117).
Complexity theory further applies at increasingly
larger scales and scopes where we encounter even
more puzzling issues as the concept of ‘‘an individual
organism’’ is inadequate to deal with the life-cycle
and well-being of an entire colony, nest, or mott
(often referred to as a ‘‘super-organism’’) over a long
term (Keller & Ross, 1993, pp. 335 36; Strerelny,
2001, p. 334). At the next level, systems of systems
develop as ecological networks (as communities of
different kinds of organisms in their relationships
to dimensions of shared environments). Though
disagreements remain about whether ecosystems
might be autopoietic in the strong sense applicable
to cells and organisms, there is substantial
agreement that ecosystems are dynamic complex
adaptive systems of autopoietic and other elements
(Millennial Ecosystem Assessment, 2003, pp. 49 
51). Since ecosystems such as coral reefs and tropical
rainforests ‘‘exhibit emergent properties, positive and
negative feedback, generated and operative within
physical and biological parameters’’ complexity
sciences are important for understanding and mana-
ging their high diversity (increasingly threatened by
habitat fragmentation and loss, especially within
patch dynamics) (Sole ´ & Goodwin, 2000, pp. 3,
29, 179, 191 192).
As we better appreciate the importance of eco-
logical systems, we are led to the idea of health and
well-being as sustainability or resilience (Gunderson
& Pritchard, 2002). Emphasis on stability as the
measure and thus goal of becoming or remaining
healthy correlates with scientific and social ideas of
preservation and conservation, and most of restora-
tion. However, seeing natural systems as dynami-
cally, constantly changing has led to complexity
theory’s concept of ‘‘resilience*the capacity of a
system to absorb disturbance and still retain its basic
formation and structure’’ or to shift to another
possible stable state involving different behaviors
and structure. This new focus on discontinuous and
non-reversible processes across bifurcations recog-
nizes and embraces rather than resists more sub-
stantial change in the form of possible entire regime
shifts and explores how diversity promotes adaptive
capacity for ecosystem well-being (Schneider &
Sagan, 2005).
The local particularity and plurality of co-
constituted lifeworlds and ecological systems needs
Anatomy of life and well-being
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to social and economic processes at regional to
continental scales’’ (Gunderson & Pritchard, 2002,
p. 64). Complementary with science’s attempt to
discern ecosystem boundaries in terms of ‘‘where a
number of discontinuities coincide, for instance in
the distribution of organisms, soil types, drainage
basins, or depth in a water body’’ (Millennial
Ecosystem Assessment, 2003, p. 51), indispensible
cognitive contributions come from phenomeno-
logical descriptions of how:
...the bio-cultural region provides the common
context for everyday life. // These commonalities,
rooted in the biology, geology, and climate of the
area, have tended to unify the inhabitants and to
differentiate them from the members of other
regions. (Coates, 1981, p. 402)
Here we return to our ethical political dilemmas,
situated within the not yet explicitly debated
valuations or implications of contending anthro-,
bio-, and theo-centric world-views (Mugerauer &
Manzo, 2008).
Micro- to macro-horizons and phenomenological-
complexity interpretations
A final step remains, out to the micro- and macro-
horizons of the material world*the planetary
environments that both emerge from the lower-level
orders of processes as well as operate in positive-
feedback loops with the underlying physico-chemical
properties in the global dynamic that obviously
impacts the health and well-being of all people and
other organisms.
Macro/Cosmic                  
    Atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere  
       biosphere 
         Bio-cultural regions 
         Ecosystems of communities 
        Organisms   distinctive lifeworlds            
         Membranes and cells                  
         Bio-chemical/molecular (genetic)  
    physical–chemical 
 Micro/Sub-atomic 
In its largest extension complexity informs the
whole of the earth and its life*the biosphere*
and the macro-scale organism environment co-
constitutions (Schneider & Sagan, 2005, p. 144).
The major paradigm shift in thermodynamics
‘‘has achieved a bridge between microscopic and
macroscopic physics’’ (Prigogine, 1980, pp. 195 
197): ‘‘fluctuations [that] are the macroscopic man-
ifestations of fundamental properties of fluctuations
arisingonthemicroscopiclevelofunstabledynamical
systems’’ occur in the flows of gasses and fluids that
appear as weather and climate (Prigogine, 1997,
p. 18). That is, ‘‘non-equilibrium, positive feedback
loops, transition phenomena, and evolution’’ char-
acterize non-linear complex behavior among sea and
air temperatures,atmosphericcirculationandclouds,
ocean currents exchanging heat, periodic glaciations,
sea level rise and fall, precipitation, moist and desert
zones,andinfluxofsolarenergy(Nicolis&Prigogine,
1989, pp. 36 40, 226 228). Pressing beyond the
physical chemical realms of energy dissipation and
the self-organization of geology and geomorphology
scientistshavedeveloped‘‘atheoryofco-evolutionary
assembly’’ to describe processes that have ‘‘yield
[ed] a self-organized critical biosphere // over the
past 650 million years’’ (Kauffman, 2000, pp. 21,
188 194).
The spectacular organism 10 environment co-
constitution that originally changed the course of life
on earth through the dramatic circulation between
the micro- and the macro-spheres and that continues
to self-reorganize is of major concern today since the
health and well-being of all life occurs within the
contexts of regional and planetary pollution and
weather patterns writ large as climate (Schneider &
Sagan, 2005, pp. 183 186, 198). One of our greatest
challenges is to comprehensively combine analysis
of the dynamic complexity of atmospheric,
hydrospheric, and lithospheric phenomena with the
distinctive features of living processes. The task is to
accomplish a cooperative mode of better approach-
ing the ‘‘total environment’’ (Juarrero, 2002, p. 110).
Conclusion
The point of using the arc of life and corresponding
multiple modes of understanding as the framework
for future work, rather than an anatomy only about
theories of well-being or health, is that the latter,
however important, must be seen in the context of
the entire existential lifeworld. It is precisely this
relationship of human and micro- and macro-
environmental life that is too often taken for granted
or over-simplified. The dimensions of life, their
character and symbioses/tensions, provide a non-
arbitrary basis for proceeding with individual facets
and attempts to integrate large spheres of the subject
matter.
Qualitative differences have phenomenally
operated in the universe from the beginning as living
beings emerged and became increasingly distinct
Robert Mugerauer
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always have depended upon adequate qualitative
modes of discernment, interpretation, and response
(since only the prior identification of quali-
tative differences yields the ‘‘distinct’’ features that
we intend to measure and compare in quantitative
terms or in terms of causal relationships). Congru-
ently, any future goals we develop in social policy/
management and health-care practices, in fact even
scientific knowledge, depend on and are subsumed
in the practical qualitative judgments made ethically
and politically in regard to parameters, priorities,
and resource allocation that drive both empirical
research programs and the productive/consumptive
actions within our health-care systems.
Implications for an agenda for qualitative studies on
health and well-being
We do need to treat individuals (whole organisms),
especially in the case of human persons; but we
see the limited value of exclusionary attention. In
working out the arc of life we find:
. The health of any dimension is interconnected
with so many other dimensions that it makes
little sense to think of the health of any
one ‘‘thing,’’ neither cell nor organ, nor even
organisms, since health is a function of life both
in and as communities. Since humans emerge
from and co-constitute both their sub- and
supra-contexts, we need to approach health as
a matter of not only being in ecosystems, but as
ecosystems (Margulis & Sagan, 2002, p. 19).
. Specifically, in the case of persons, disclosures
of value, health, and well-being in historical,
social lifeworlds, are
k a matter of the individual’s lived capacity,
which concretely provides the norm of
pathology (Canguilhem, 2008; Goldstein,
2000);
k inseparable from bio-cultural regions or
ecologies within which we live; and
k finally cultural events, since persons only
fully reach their potential as being together
with others (Maturana & Varela, 1998;
Plessner, 1980).
. The provision of and access to services falls
across a continuum, with well-being at the pole
of high-positive satisfaction, while the other,
low-negative pole is the condition of poverty
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003).
Hence, poverty enters the picture as the depri-
vation of well-being, opening issues of justice at
the heart of provision of services (Lewontin &
Levins, 2007).
Thus, with a new appreciation of the contingency,
particularity, and complex co-constitution operative
in our individual and social lives, in the unfolding of
all forms of life itself, in the correlation between
ecological and human health and well-being we need
to complement the quantitative with qualitative at
every juncture. The intention of this essay is to take a
next step by providing a framework that is not
‘‘news,’’ but whose delineation might provide a
common ground for future collaborative work.
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